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In my forthcoming book, How to Count Animals, More or Less (based on my 2016 
Uehiro Lectures in Practical Ethics), I argue for a hierarchical approach to animal 
ethics according to which animals have moral standing but nonetheless have a lower 
moral status than people have.  this essay is an overview of that book, drawing pri-
marily from selections from its beginning and end, aiming both to give a feel for the 
overall project and to indicate the general shape of the hierarchical position that I 
defend there.  In this essay, I contrast the hierarchical approach with its most im-
portant rival (which holds that people and animals have the very same moral status), 
sketch the main idea behind one central argument for hierarchy, and briefly review 
three potentially troubling implications of the hierarchical view.  I close with a discus-
sion of a promising possible solution to the most worrisome of the three objections.
I
One of the most striking developments in moral philosophy over the last half 
century has been the remarkable explosion in the discussion of animal ethics, that 
part of moral philosophy that deals with our moral obligations toward (nonhuman) 
animals. It would of course be an exaggeration, but only a mild one, to say that fifty 
years ago philosophical discussion of the treatment of animals was virtually nonex-
istent. the topic suffered from something close to complete neglect. On the rare oc-
casion when a moral philosopher had something to say about animals, it was largely 
a matter of admitting—albeit only in passing—that it was wrong to be cruel to them, 
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that the gratuitous infliction of pain was morally problematic. And then, for the most 
part, the matter was typically left at that.
Fifty years later the pendulum has swung the other way. Animal ethics is now a 
well entrenched subdiscipline within the field of moral philosophy as a whole. there 
is an ever growing cascade of books and articles devoted to the subject, a constant 
stream of journals and conferences. What’s more, it seems to me that a particular 
philosophical position within animal ethics has emerged as well.
I hesitate to say that it is the dominant view. I doubt if there is enough consensus 
in the philosophical literature on animal ethics to have much of anything substantive 
lay claim to a title like that. but it does seem to me that many theorists are drawn to 
some version of the view I have in mind.
Here’s the basic idea. According to this view, otherwise similar harms or benefits 
for people and animals count equally from the moral point of view. “Pain is pain,” 
as the point is sometimes put.1 In this sense, animals and people can be said to have 
the same moral status. to be sure, there are important differences between people 
and other animals, including differences in terms of which goods and which bads are 
likely to be at stake in any given case. these, in turn, can make it morally appropri-
ate to treat people and animals differently. but that’s not because animals somehow 
count less than people do, from the moral point of view. On the contrary, similar 
goods (or similar bads) are to be treated the same, regardless of whose interests are at 
stake. that is to say, in and of itself it matters not at all whether we are talking about 
the interests of a person or the interests of an animal. Similar interests are to be given 
equal weight in our moral deliberation, regardless of whether we are dealing with a 
person or an animal. Strictly speaking, everyone has the same moral status.
For obvious reasons, it would be natural to call this position egalitarianism. It 
assigns the same weight to the interests of animals and of people. It gives the same 
moral status to both, considering neither group higher or lower than the other.
but for still other reasons, equally obvious, it would be potentially misleading to 
call the position in question egalitarianism, for the label is already in use as the name 
for views that hold that equality has moral significance in its own right (for example, 
that there is value in the equal distribution of welfare). Using the term “egalitarian-
ism” for the first sort of view as well would only invite needless confusion. So we’ll 
need another name for the position I am trying to describe.
1. For example, Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, updated ed. (Harpercollins, 2009), p. 20; and 
David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously (cambridge, 1996), p. 234.
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Accordingly, I propose to call the view in question unitarianism, since it holds 
that there is only one kind of moral status—a status shared by both people and 
animals. the name is far from ideal, I suppose, but I cannot think of a better one, and 
if nothing else it has the advantage that “unitarianism” is not already the name of any 
sort of prominent position in moral philosophy.
Unsurprisingly, unitarians differ from one another in all sorts of ways. For it is 
one thing to say that all of us—people and animals alike—have the same moral status. 
It is quite another thing to spell out what that status involves, just how it is that we 
are morally required to treat one another. thus there can be, for example, unitarian 
utilitarians, instructing us to bring about the greatest balance of pleasure over pain. 
As unitarians, such utilitarians simply remind us to count the pleasures and pains 
of animals every bit as much as the pleasures and pains of people. And there can be 
unitarian deontologists as well, instructing us, say, to avoid harming the innocent (even 
if the results of harming them would be better overall). As unitarians, such deontolo-
gists remind us to avoid harming innocent animals, just as we are to avoid harming 
innocent people. In short, almost all of the sundry debates within normative ethics 
remain contentious and unresolved even if we embrace unitarianism. In and of itself, 
unitarianism doesn’t tell us how to treat people or animals; it only tells us that the 
same fundamental rights extend to all.
there is a lot to be said in favor of unitarianism. but one advantage should be 
apparent from the start. If we accept unitarianism then it is reasonably easy to see 
how to extend our moral theory so that it covers not only people but animals as well.
the truth, of course, is that in the past almost all of our moral theorizing has 
been limited to thinking about people. And while, as I have just observed, the debates 
in normative ethics are far from resolved, it does seem fair to say that for the most part 
what we have been working our way towards, by means of these debates, is a moral 
theory that would accurately tell us about the obligations that people have toward 
people. So even if you have such a normative theory worked out to your own satisfac-
tion, strictly speaking you still face the question of how to extend or generalize that 
theory so that it covers animals as well. Unitarianism provides a simple and straight-
forward answer to that question: our interactions with animals are governed by the 
very same set of principles that govern our interactions with people (as spelled out 
by your favorite moral theory). Armed with a normative theory adequate for dealing 
with people, there is no further work to be done.
In contrast to the unitarian approach to animal ethics, it seems to me that 
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common sense embraces, rather, a hierarchical approach, where animals count, but 
count in a lesser way. On this alternative view, people have a higher moral status than 
animals do. there are still restrictions on how we are to treat animals, but these are 
not the very same restrictions that govern our treatment of people. People have rights 
that animals lack, or have stronger rights, or perhaps a person’s interests count for 
more than (or count in different ways from) an animal’s.
Admittedly, one should probably hesitate before making confident assertions 
about common sense in this area. Some people apparently believe that animals don’t 
have any sort of moral standing at all; they are merely one more resource to be used 
as we see fit.
I suppose there is a sense in which a view like this—where animals lack moral 
standing altogether—could still be described as hierarchical, since people clearly 
have a higher status on this account than animals do. but similarly, there is a sense in 
which such a view could instead be called unitarian, since it holds that there is indeed 
only a single moral status (that had by people). but as I intend to use the terms, at any 
rate, neither label applies to those who simply deny the moral standing of animals. As I 
intend to use the terms, both unitarians and hierarchy theorists agree that animals do 
indeed count, morally speaking; animals have moral standing. Unitarians and hierar-
chy theorists differ only in terms of whether animals have the very same moral status 
as people or a lower one. Accordingly, if enough people believe that animals don’t 
count morally at all, then it would be a mistake to claim that common sense embraces 
a hierarchical approach.
I suspect that most people reject the extreme claim that only people count. What 
I take to be the common view, rather, is that animals do indeed count morally, but 
they simply do not count in the very same way that people do. Animals count for less.
Of course, here too, there remains tremendous room for disagreement. In addi-
tion to the familiar debates from normative ethics about the details of our obligations 
toward people, questions about the appropriate extension of our normative theory (so 
that it covers animals too) now become pressing and difficult. After all, it is one thing 
to say that animals count, but in a lesser way. It is quite another thing to spell out 
exactly how they count, what it really means to say they count in a lesser way. If the 
interests of animals are not to be counted in precisely the same fashion as the inter-
ests of people, how then are they to be counted? Although it does seem to me to be 
true that common sense accepts a hierarchical approach (or, at a minimum, it is true 
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that a lot of people accept something like that idea), I don’t think there is anything 
close to a clear understanding of what the lesser standing of animals entails.
In my book, How to Count Animals, More or Less, I argue for a hierarchical ap-
proach to animal ethics. Given what I have just said, then, at best I can only partially 
claim the mantle of common sense. I do think that many readers will find my central 
thesis—that the right approach to animal ethics is a hierarchical one—to be fairly 
obvious, hardly worth arguing for. but at the same time, if I am right that there is 
nothing like a consensus about what the lower status of animals comes to, then I 
imagine that the various specifics that I discuss remain controversial.
Accordingly, at various places in the book I take some initial steps toward trying 
to develop a moral theory that is appropriately sensitive to differences in moral status. 
I explore, for example, what might be involved in extending some common distrib-
utive principles (such as egalitarianism, or a priority view) to animals, while taking 
into account the fact that animals count for less than people do, with some animals 
counting still less than others. Similarly, I ask what certain deontological principles 
or rights might look like—such as the right not to be harmed, or the right to self-
defense—once we modify them so as to reflect the various differences in status that 
we find between people and animals, or among animals.
However, it is probably best to admit that in my book I don’t actually develop a 
detailed hierarchical theory. At best, I offer a sketch of what a theory like that might 
be like. In fact, truth be told, in many places—really, in most places—all I do is try to 
point out how desperately far we currently are from having an adequate moral theory 
when it comes to the treatment of animals. Unlike the unitarians, who think it a rela-
tively trivial matter to extend moral theory to cover animals, I find myself thinking 
that we remain very much in the dark about how best to do that. I can only say how 
to count animals more or less.
I do however want to emphasize one further point. Although I defend a hier-
archical approach to animal ethics, I do so with considerable misgivings, for I am 
afraid that some may come away thinking that my aim to is to defend an approach 
that would justify much or all of our current treatment of animals. After all, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that it is part of the commonly accepted view that our treat-
ment of animals is, in the main (even if not in all specifics), morally acceptable; and I 
have already suggested that the common view is a hierarchical one. So in defending 
hierarchy, aren’t I defending—in broad strokes, at least, if not with regard to every 
detail—our current treatment of animals?
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but nothing like this is remotely the case. Our treatment of animals is a moral 
horror of unspeakable proportions, staggering the imagination. Absolutely nothing 
that I say here is intended to offer any sort of justification for the myriad appalling 
and utterly unacceptable ways in which we mistreat, abuse, and torture animals.
In this regard the unitarians have an easier time of it. No one would be tempted 
for even a moment to suggest that we already treat animals in anything like the way 
that morality requires us to treat people. So unitarians are very well positioned to 
condemn current practices for the moral monstrosities that they are.
but that doesn’t make unitarianism the truth. On the contrary, it seems to me to 
be true both that animals count for less than people and yet, for all that, that they still 
count sufficiently that there is simply no justification whatsoever for anything close 
to current practices. It may be less straightforward to condemn our abuse of animals 
once one embraces a hierarchical view, but it is still important to do so.
Having said that, however, I should nonetheless warn the reader that the requi-
site arguments for the unjustifiability of our treatment of animals will not be found 
in my book. to work out those arguments with care one first needs to articulate in 
detail the appropriate hierarchical normative theory; and as I have already suggested, 
it seems clear to me that we are very far indeed from having anything like that. My 
book is intended as a contribution to the attempt to produce the relevant hierarchical 
theory. but the truth is, it throws out far more questions than it answers.
II
A hierarchical approach to normative ethics emerges rather naturally from two 
plausible thoughts. First, the various features that underlie moral standing come in 
degrees so that some individuals have these features to a greater extent than others 
do (or in more developed or more sophisticated forms). Second, absent some special 
explanation for why things should be otherwise, we would expect that those who do 
have those features to a greater extent would, accordingly, count more from the moral 
point of view. When we put these two thoughts together they constitute what is to 
my mind a rather compelling (if abstract) argument for hierarchy.
Some of the implications of this line of thought seem to me completely conge-
nial. On the one hand, many animals clearly do have some of the features that ground 
moral standing, so these animals count, morally speaking. Indeed, it is plausible to 
think that they count for far more than we ordinarily recognize. (certainly they count 
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for far, far more than one would think, given the appalling ways we normally treat 
them.) but at the same time, I think it is also clear that animals have fewer of the rel-
evant features than people have (or they have them to a lesser degree), so that animals 
count for less than people. All of which is just to say: there are different degrees of 
moral status, and people have a higher status than that had by animals. What’s more, 
and this is a third plausible implication of this basic line of thought, since animals 
themselves vary, one to the next, in terms of their possession of the relevant features, 
some animals have a higher moral status than others.
Now it sometimes happens in philosophy that an abstract argument that seems 
otherwise persuasive has implications that are hard to accept. One then faces the dif-
ficult question of whether to accept the argument and its troubling implications or 
instead somehow resist the argument (and thus avoid the implications), by abandon-
ing some initially plausible premise. Happily, we don’t face this dilemma with regard 
to the abstract argument for hierarchy that I just rehearsed. For as I argue at length in 
the book, these implications are plausible in their own right. Indeed, the hierarchical 
approach allows us to avoid various unattractive or absurd conclusions with which 
we might otherwise be saddled. Overall, then, the hierarchical approach is rendered 
even more plausible by virtue of its implications.
but that’s not to say that there are no cases at all where hierarchy leads to results 
that may be surprising or even intuitively difficult to accept. On the contrary, I suspect 
that no position that we could adopt on the issues surrounding animal ethics will be 
a completely comfortable one for us to embrace. Accordingly, our aim should be to 
think through the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the various alternative 
views and tentatively accept the view that seems to offer the most attractive position 
overall—all the while recognizing that even the view that does best in terms of this 
comparative assessment will have at least some implications that may trouble us.
In my book I identify three such implications of hierarchy, ones that might rea-
sonably give us pause. First, just as ordinary adult human persons have a higher moral 
status than animals do, anyone who accepts hierarchy must be open to the possibility 
of “superior beings,” beings with a status even higher than our own. I know that this 
is a possibility that some would like to disallow, but speaking personally I think it 
shouldn’t really bother us. the possibility of such beings may be a humbling one; but 
it’s not, I think, unacceptable.
More worrisome, second, is the existence of “marginal cases,” humans with such 
severe cognitive impairments that they simply fail to count as persons at all. Given 
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their restricted and diminished psychological capacities, it seems inevitable that 
their moral status will be lower than our own. I argue that an appeal to something I 
call modal personhood—the fact that such severely impaired humans could have been 
people—can reduce the bite of this implication somewhat (giving marginal humans a 
higher status than animals that are their psychological peers); but I would not want to 
deny that most of us would find it difficult—initially, at least—to accept the thought 
that the severely impaired count for less. Nonetheless, since the alternatives (such as 
unitarianism) seem to me even less plausible, this does seem to me to be the view that 
we should, upon reflection, accept as well.
but that still leaves a third troubling implication, which I call “the problem of 
normal variation.” It is one thing to accept that those with capacities far beyond ours 
(superior beings) or far below ours (marginal cases) would have a status different from 
our own. It is quite another thing to accept the claim that since even ordinary adult 
human persons differ, one to the next, in terms of their various psychological capaci-
ties, they must also differ, one to the next, in terms of their moral status, with some of 
us having (slightly) lower status than others.
Even this last implication will not seem unacceptable to everyone. Viewed 
against the tremendous range of relevant capacities that we find among creatures 
with moral standing (think of the minimal agency and—perhaps—sentience of a fly, 
as compared to the incomparably rich cognitive and emotional lives of persons), the 
differences found among ordinary adult humans will be relatively trivial. For all prac-
tical purposes, then, these differences may be ones that are sufficiently limited that 
we are quite justified in simply disregarding them. On such a view, there may indeed 
be minor differences in moral status from one person to the next, but these differ-
ences will justifiably play no role in our moral deliberations.
As I say, some may find this last response sufficiently plausible and reassuring 
to put the concern to rest. Indeed, for the most part, that’s true in my own case as 
well. but I know that many others will remain uncomfortable (to say the least) at the 
thought that there may be genuine, even if small, differences in our moral statuses. 
these people will understandably wonder whether there is a more robust answer to 
the problem of normal variation.
A response capable of giving all of us (that is, all normal adult humans) the very 
same moral status would need to somehow overcome the presumption stated above 
that variations in the features underlying moral standing should result in corre-
sponding variations in moral status. the claim would have to be, rather, that certain 
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minor variations in psychological capacities (the kinds of differences we see displayed 
among ordinary persons) actually make no difference to status at all. Instead of status 
increasing steadily with increases in the relevant capacities, status would have to 
grow less smoothly than this, remaining flat or constant over the range of variation 
we find among normal humans.
Of course, if there were only one moral status—if unitarianism were true—we 
would have this result automatically. For if there is only one status, not only does 
the normal variation in the relevant capacities that we find among ordinary persons 
make no difference to status, no variations in those capacities make any difference at 
all. Under unitarianism, after all, as long as one has moral standing of any sort, one’s 
status is exactly the same as everyone else’s, no matter how much it might be the case 
that other individuals have the relevant capacities to a greater or to a lesser extent. In 
effect, under unitarianism status would remain flat or constant across the board—for 
all beings with moral standing whatsoever—not just for ordinary adult persons.
but as I argue in my book, we have ample reason to reject unitarianism. So a 
plausible view here is going to have to be a more complicated one than that. Another 
alternative, I suppose, would be a view according to which moral status can indeed 
vary and does indeed increase with greater capacities (as we move up the animal 
kingdom)—until we reach the range of capacities found among normal adult humans, 
at which point status stops increasing. (conceivably, it might start up again once we 
get past the normal range of human capacities, so that superior beings might still have 
a status higher than our own.) the problem with a view like this, of course, is that it 
is difficult to see what could be so special about the particular range of capacities that 
normal humans happen to display, such that here and here alone small variations in 
capacity make no difference to status, while at other levels they do.
More plausible, I suspect, would be a view according to which this sort of 
feature—where certain variations in capacities make no difference to status—is 
found repeatedly, not just when it comes to normal human capacities. Perhaps status 
is regularly flat or constant over a given range of variation in capacities. but instead of 
imagining that all levels of capacity elicit the very same status (which is, after all, the 
unitarian position), we can suppose that there are a number of such ranges, where 
each such range elicits a different (constant) status.
If a view like this can be defended, it would hold out the possibility of solving 
the problem of normal variation. It would also, obviously, have implications for what 
we should say about the status of animals as well. Instead of holding—as we might 
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otherwise do—that whenever two animals differ in their capacities they differ in 
moral status as well, we will instead think of the animal kingdom as being divided 
into an appropriate number of broad categories, where each such category is assigned 
a single corresponding status. No doubt dogs will still have a higher status than fish, 
say, but minor variations in capacities among fish (for example) will not ground even 
minor differences in the resulting statuses.
Note that a position like this needn’t be seen as incompatible with the second 
premise of the abstract argument I sketched at the start of this section. As I intended 
that claim, at any rate, it wasn’t an assertion that status must go up with increasing ca-
pacities. rather, it was describing what we should expect to happen in the absence of 
some special mechanism capable of producing a different effect. that is, I meant only 
to suggest that status will increase with capacities unless there is some special mecha-
nism or force that prevents this from happening. Accordingly, those attracted to the 
idea that minor differences in relevant psychological capacities normally make no 
difference to moral status need only insist that there is such a mechanism, something 
that “overrides” the fact that there is a range of capacities that holds among normal 
adult humans (or, for that matter, among fish), thus blocking the effect—increasing 
status—that we would otherwise expect.
What might such a mechanism look like? I believe that a promising answer 
emerges if we adopt a “realistic” approach to evaluating moral principles, that is, if 
candidate rules are evaluated (by the relevant foundational machinery) under real-
istic assumptions about the epistemic and motivational limitations of actual moral 
agents.
the details will differ, of course, depending on the specifics of one’s foundation-
al theory (whether rule consequentialism, contractarianism, ideal observer theory, 
or what have you). but whatever one’s foundational theory, one can adopt a version 
of the theory which is sensitive to what we are actually like, one which uses realistic 
assumptions about our cognitive and motivational limitations, when evaluating po-
tential moral rules. theories like this share a commitment to practical realism. And I 
believe that if one accepts practical realism then one is likely to end up with a norma-
tive theory that includes only a few different levels of moral status, since more com-
plicated approaches to status will be poor choices for moral agents with the kinds of 
limitations that we actually have. Arguably, then, despite the differences in psycho-
logical capacities that we really do find among people, all of us may nonetheless have 
the very same moral status.
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III
I have suggested that theories that incorporate practical realism may end up with 
a coarse-grained approach to hierarchy, one where instead of having a continuum of 
possible levels for moral status there will only be a fixed number of such levels (so that 
even individuals who differ in terms of their psychological capacities may have the 
same status). Is there more that we can say about this? More that we can predict about 
the hierarchical theory that will emerge?
 I do have a few conjectures, but it is worth emphasizing the point that they are 
indeed only conjectures. Precisely because practical realism attends to empirical facts 
about the kinds of rules that we are well suited or ill suited to try to act upon, it is to 
a significant extent an empirical question what rules will emerge as optimal from any 
given foundational theory. So the conjectures I offer remain just that—mere conjec-
tures—until the relevant empirical work is done.
Similarly, it is important to bear in mind that the precise rules that emerge will 
also depend on the particular foundational theory that you embrace. Since I do not 
try to develop any of those theories in my book, at best all I can point to are a few 
broad features that, I suspect, will be common to those accounts.
Nonetheless, it does seem possible to make a few predictions. the most impor-
tant of these is of course the very claim I have already emphasized, that theories that 
embrace practical realism will generate only a few different levels of status. I’m not 
prepared to offer an exact number, but it seems likely that there won’t be more than 
a half dozen or so. (Perhaps, if we ever do encounter superior beings, we may need to 
add a few more.) My thought here is that much more than this would already involve 
us in a larger number of levels than we can readily call to mind.
It isn’t so much that we cannot readily think to ourselves that there are ten or 
twenty—or even more—levels of status. It is, after all, easy enough to think that some 
creatures have a status represented by the value 1, others by .9, others still by .8, and 
so on, down to .1. (Or, for that matter, 1, .99, .98, .97, and so on.) the worry, rather, is 
that the more categories there are, the more difficult it becomes to identify who goes 
where, and this difficulty radically increases the chances of making a mistake.
Perhaps, then, we will have only a handful of categories: one for persons, and 
another few dividing up the animal kingdom into large groups with roughly similar 
capacities. Perhaps those covering animals will simply include one level for extremely 
intelligent animals (that is, animals with fairly developed psychological capacities), 
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one for moderately intelligent animals, and one final level for minimally intelligent 
animals. Or perhaps the divisions will be a bit narrower than that, with one or two 
more levels than this.
I hesitate to actually attempt to demarcate the relevant divisions, since I know 
too little about the actual capacities of different animals, but if only for the sake of il-
lustrating the kind of approach I have in mind, let me just suggest that there might be 
one level for the most intelligent animals, those closest to being full-blown persons 
(like dolphins, whales, squid, or great apes), another for highly intelligent animals 
(like dogs, pigs, parrots), another for “midlevel” animals (rabbits, cows, squirrels), still 
another for “lower” animals (other birds, fish, reptiles), and one last level for the very 
lowest animals, with the least developed psychological capacities (such as insects and 
spiders). Again, the point here is not to claim that these are the relevant divisions, but 
only to suggest that the actual divisions will be comparably broad and inclusive, with 
relatively clear indicators of which types of animals fall into which groups.
the idea here would be to have not only a relatively small number of groupings, 
but also a relatively easy way to assign a given animal to its relevant group. After all, it 
would hardly be feasible to expect us to undertake a detailed investigation of a given 
animal’s specific psychological capacities each time we were going to interact with 
one. this makes it almost inevitable that in normal circumstances we will assign a 
given animal on the basis of its species (or, more likely still, on the basis of even larger, 
more general biological categories).
An approach like this would be similar to what we see when a rule consequen-
tialist favors a rule prohibiting doing harm. Although harming an innocent isn’t 
always the act with the worst consequences, there is nonetheless a broad correlation 
in place, so that normally we do better to simply avoid such acts rather than trying to 
directly calculate the possible consequences of our actions. because of this, despite 
its imperfections, a coarse-grained rule like “don’t harm the innocent” still earns its 
place as part of the optimal set of moral rules. Similarly, then, even though assigning 
status on the basis of species (or family, order, or even class) will not always correctly 
identify a given animal’s overall level of psychological capacities, there should none-
theless be broad correlations, so that ordinarily we will do better to assign on the 
basis of broad biological groupings, rather than trying to directly determine the given 
animal’s capacities. (Indeed, given the near universal ignorance and underestimation 
of the cognitive and emotional capacities of animals, left to our own devices most of 
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us would routinely place animals at far too low a level if we had to estimate capacities 
directly.)
Does this mean that the view that emerges will reject an individualistic approach 
to status (where one’s status turns on one’s individual properties, rather than on the 
various biological groups to which one belongs)? to some extent, perhaps, but not 
completely. For despite our rather limited ability to size up the psychological capaci-
ties of individual animals, it would be silly to suggest that we are altogether incapable 
of doing this, under any circumstances whatsoever. consider the fanciful example 
of a golden retriever who has been given a supervitamin and has now miraculously 
been turned into a person (while still remaining, nonetheless, a dog). We might well 
be able to recognize that this particular dog has psychological capacities far exceeding 
that of ordinary dogs—that this dog, unlike ordinary dogs, is a person. (Imagine, for 
example, that the dog begins to discuss with us its plans for next summer, or that we 
translate the poetry it has been writing!) In such extraordinary cases it will presum-
ably be appropriate to give the dog the very same status as we ourselves have, despite 
the fact that it remains canine. Similarly (if a bit less extreme), if a snake, say, were to 
display psychological capacities at the level of, for example, a cat, then once we rec-
ognized that fact it would be appropriate to give it a correspondingly higher status.
cases like this would be somewhat similar to the rule consequentialist’s recogni-
tion that despite the suitability of a general prohibition against harming the innocent, 
the right not to be harmed should have a threshold. For even though we are not nor-
mally very good at identifying cases where slightly more good would be done by doing 
harm, when the amount of good at stake is great enough our judgment to the effect 
that we are now in an exceptional case becomes much more reliable. Accordingly, a 
rule that permits doing harm in such extraordinary cases is actually optimal. Similarly, 
then, while the optimal rule for assigning status (given practical realism) is likely to 
tell us that in ordinary circumstances we are to do this on the basis of biological classi-
fication, it is also likely to recognize exceptions, unusual cases where we should assign 
a given individual a higher status—or, for that matter, a lower status—than that to be 
given to its biological peers.
An especially important example where we would probably be justified in de-
parting from the ordinary practice of assigning status on the basis of biological clas-
sification might be that of marginal cases, humans who are so severely impaired as 
to fall short of being a person. Just as it should be possible to recognize animals who 
tremendously exceed the psychological capacities typical of their kind, and just as 
Journal of Practical Ethics
 SHELLY KAGAN14
optimal rules for assigning status should allow for more individualized assignments 
in such cases, it also seems clearly possible to recognize humans who fall tremen-
dously short of the psychological capacities typical of normal adult humans and who 
should thus be assigned a lower status than the rest of us have. And tragically, as we 
also know, such cases—unlike our imaginary example of the golden retriever who is 
a person—are all too real.
Where then should we expect marginal cases to be placed? What status will they 
be given? to say that they will have a lower status is not yet to say on what level they 
will be placed. In this connection it is worth recalling the role that modal personhood 
(the fact that one could have been a person) may play in raising one’s status. Since we 
do seem capable of recognizing cases that involve a significant degree of modal per-
sonhood, there is no reason to assume that practical realism will direct us to simply 
disregard this feature altogether. Furthermore, it is also worth bearing in mind the 
fact if we adopt practical realism then it is important to attend not only to our epis-
temic limitations but also to our motivational ones. So if it should turn out—as might 
well be the case—that we are simply incapable of being motivated to conform to a set 
of rules that would direct us to treat impaired humans as no better than their psycho-
logical peers, then we should anticipate that the severely impaired will have a higher 
status than we might otherwise have expected (based on their actual capacities alone).
Suppose, then, that on the optimal classificatory scheme that emerges from prac-
tical realism there is a group for animals that fall just short of being persons, or that are 
persons but only in a more limited way than normal adult humans. It is conceivable 
that marginal cases may belong here as well (despite having less developed capacities 
than the various animals that are assigned to this level). Alternatively, it might turn 
out that practical realism will direct us to distinguish between more and less severe 
instances of marginal cases. (Perhaps those who fail to be persons but who nonethe-
less manifest a reasonable degree of agency will be assigned a higher status than those 
who are so impaired that they display little or no agency at all.) Indeed, given the like-
lihood that we are not particularly effective at identifying impaired humans who fall 
just short of being persons, it could easily turn out that the optimal rules will tell us 
to place even the significantly impaired at the same level as ordinary persons. Perhaps 
only the most extreme and unmistakable cases of severe cognitive impairment will be 
assigned a lower moral status at all.
I am not prepared to choose among these various alternatives; too much turns 
on empirical matters I don’t feel at all confident about. (I am particularly uncertain as 
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to what motivational limitations there might be concerning how we are able to treat 
impaired humans.) but the point remains that practical realism could play a signifi-
cant role in determining the moral status of the severely impaired, and this might well 
result in assigning them a higher status than we might otherwise think warranted.
In broad outline, then, the kind of view that I think most likely to emerge if one 
accepts practical realism looks like this: there will be only a small number of levels of 
status, and in ordinary circumstances individuals will have their status assigned on 
the basis of species or other, broader, biological classifications, though in exceptional 
cases—where the individual clearly has significantly higher or lower capacities than 
is normal for creatures of their kind—appropriate adjustments (up or down) to status 
are to be made. clearly, any number of details remain to be worked out, but it does 
seem to me that this kind of limited hierarchy (as we might call it), is the most likely 
implication of practical realism.
For reasons that I have suggested, I think it unlikely that there will be all that 
many different levels of status in such a system, probably no more than four, five, or 
six, or so. but in principle, of course, the number could be higher than that, if we, as 
moral agents, have rather higher epistemic abilities than I am currently inclined to 
give us credit for. Still, even if the number of levels were twice or three times what 
I am imagining (and I very much doubt it could be much higher than that), it is ex-
tremely unlikely that more than one of these levels applies to normal adult humans. 
So however the details get worked out, it does seem reasonable to expect that an 
appeal to practical realism will solve the problem of normal variation. In effect, a suit-
able form of limited hierarchy will have only one level “to spare” to cover the full 
range of ordinary human capacities.
It might be claimed, however, that I have actually been too liberal in describing 
the number of levels that will emerge from practical realism. I have suggested there 
may be as many as six or so, but conceivably, of course, the number might be even 
smaller than that. Since it is, after all, an empirical matter (at least in part) how many 
levels are optimal, anyone who embraces practical realism must be open to the pos-
sibility that given our actual epistemic limitations it is a mistake to generate a system 
with any distinctions in moral status at all. that is to say, it might be that the optimal 
set of rules, given practical realism, would involve only one single status, with the 
very same status being assigned to all creatures with any moral standing at all. this is, 
of course, the unitarian position. So in principle, at least, we can see how one possible 
argument for unitarianism might emerge out of an appeal to practical realism.
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Less extreme, though still more limited than what I have suggested, would be a 
view according to which the optimal set of rules would recognize only two different 
levels of moral status, one for persons and another for animals. On such a view, all 
animals would have the very same moral status, though people would nonetheless 
have a higher one. conceivably, a version of what I call restricted deontology might be 
defended along lines like this; that’s a view according to which people have deonto-
logical rights, but animals, in contrast, are to be treated in keeping with consequen-
tialism. Alternatively, it might be possible to defend, instead, a view where animals 
were granted deontological standing as well, but of a weaker sort than the deonto-
logical standing granted to persons.
As I say, views of these more extreme types do seem possible, and in principle, 
at least, someone who appeals to practical realism should be prepared to entertain 
their possibility. but that’s not to say that it seems especially likely that views of these 
more extreme sorts will emerge. On the contrary, it seems to me that these views go 
too far in their pessimism about our epistemic abilities. At least, that’s the case if they 
are defended (as I have just been considering the possibility of doing) by means of an 
appeal to practical realism.
to be sure, anyone who embraces practical realism must take full cognizance 
of our epistemic limitations. And I have of course been emphasizing the thought 
that if we do this we are led to a more limited form of hierarchy, one with at most a 
small number of levels of moral status. but practical realism requires not only that 
we be realistic about our limits, it also requires that we be realistic about our abilities. 
So should the suggestion be made that we are altogether incapable of successfully 
drawing any distinctions at all (not even one between persons and animals) or at most 
one such distinction (precisely that between persons and animals), then it seems to 
me that any such assessment of our epistemic abilities is unduly crimped. It would 
run afoul of practical realism to have too many levels of moral status. but it would 
also run afoul of that very same idea to have too few.
Of course, it must be conceded that if even a limited form of hierarchy is to be 
adequately defended one must eventually show just how and why one’s favored foun-
dational theory supports a hierarchical approach to status in the first place. Although 
I argue that practical realism—if one accepts it—puts pressure on hierarchical views 
to guarantee that there are neither too many nor too few levels, I don’t try to argue at 
all for the claim that it is in fact a hierarchical view (of some sort) that will emerge from 
the most plausible foundational theories. Or rather, a bit more accurately, I don’t to 
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do that directly. For I do argue at various places in my book that only a hierarchical 
normative theory will yield intuitively acceptable answers on a number of different 
moral issues. So I presume that any acceptable foundational theory will, in fact, not 
only grant animals moral standing, it will also generate hierarchy of some sort. Still, 
in How to Count Animals, More or Less I don’t try to explore exactly how and why such 
hierarchy would emerge from any given foundational view. that is work for another 
occasion. the more limited point I am trying to make here is that given that an ad-
equate foundational view will in fact generate hierarchy at the normative level, if we 
also embrace practical realism then the result will be a limited hierarchy of the sort I 
have been describing.
IV
As I have already remarked, in broad outlines the view I arrive at bears a strik-
ing resemblance to what may well be the commonsense view. For I imagine that most 
people would concede that animals count morally, and they would certainly also 
insist that animals count less than people do. Similarly, I take it to be something like 
the commonsense view that although animals count, they don’t all count in the same 
way: some matter more, morally, than others do. Furthermore, I imagine that most 
people either accept or come close to accepting something very much like a limited 
hierarchy view, according to which there are at most only a small number of morally 
relevant divisions within the animal kingdom, with higher animals (for example, 
dogs, monkeys and whales) counting for more than other animals (such as chickens, 
rabbits, and mice) who in turn count for still more than the rest (like fish, perhaps, or 
maybe insects).
but this very similarity brings us back to a concern I expressed at the outset of 
this overview, that my position in How to Count Animals, More or Less will be miscon-
strued and taken to be a defense of something like current attitudes and practices 
toward animals. After all, people count more than animals do, right?
I hope it is clear that any such interpretation would be a gross misunderstanding 
of my actual view. Animals count for less than people do, but they count for far, far 
more than we ordinarily acknowledge.
the day may come when it will be common to look back on mankind’s long 
history of abuse of animals and recognize it as the disgrace and horror that it is. but 
that day is not yet upon us. conceivably, then, given the widespread mistreatment 
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and disregard for animal interests that continues to this very day—indeed, given the 
innumerable ways in which abuse of animals runs almost unnoticed through count-
less aspects of human life—it may well be the case that the most pressing task for moral 
philosophy with regard to animals is to establish that they really do count morally, 
and that they count for a tremendously great deal more than we seem ready to ac-
knowledge (given the horrific ways we actually treat them).
crucial though it is, that is not the task I have undertaken in my book. For it 
seems to me that no such project can be successful unless it is undertaken in full ac-
knowledgment of another essential fact about animals—the fact that although they 
do count morally, they count for less than people do. the moral theory with regard 
to animals that we need to be defending is indeed a hierarchical one; and until that 
fact is more widely recognized in the philosophical literature, I suspect that many of 
our efforts to secure decent and just treatment for animals will be doomed to failure.
Perhaps that is an overly pessimistic assessment. I hope so. but even if so, at the 
very least it seems obvious to me that our understanding of ethics—not just animal 
ethics, but all of ethics—will be confused and incomplete until such time as the sig-
nificance of status is properly taken into account.
